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Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
I. Introduction
Facing the most severe recession since the 1930s, and probably 
the longest as well, the U.S. government has adopted an aggressive 
countercyclical fiscal policy stance, beginning with the “Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008” in February of that year, shortly after the 
recession’s designated starting date, and followed one year later by 
the much larger “American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 
2009.”  Each of the bills, adopted under different presidents, con-
tained temporary tax rebates for households and temporary invest-
ment incentives for firms, indicating at least limited bipartisan ac-
ceptance of these approaches to countercyclical stimulus. The 2009 
act, amounting to 5.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), also 
included a variety of government spending provisions, most notably 
the funding of “shovel-ready” infrastructure projects and aid to state 
governments. And, even as signs are appearing that the recession’s 
end is near or already past, calls continue for the passage of yet an-
other stimulus bill in 2009. Almost all Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have introduced 
stimulus measures, with the packages averaging 2.5 percent of GDP 
across the OECD.1328  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
This fiscal policy activism is striking, given the consensus a de-
cade ago against the use of discretionary fiscal policy as a stabiliza-
tion tool.2  In addition to traditional concerns about policy lags that 
seemed confirmed by certain unfortunate policy episodes, economists 
had provided various theoretical arguments and some evidence sug-
gesting that multipliers might be small and that expectations could 
wreak havoc not only with the strength of policy effects but also with 
attempts at getting the timing right. The associated exclusive focus 
on automatic stabilizers and the use of monetary policy seems now 
to have come to an abrupt halt. While the depth and duration of the 
recession and the unusual challenges facing monetary policy, includ-
ing hitting a zero nominal interest rate constraint for all practical 
purposes, undoubtedly contributed to this reliance on discretionary 
fiscal policy, the current policy environment is in other respects hos-
tile to activist policy. In particular, adding to government liabilities 
carries obvious economic risks when the medium- and long-term 
budget outlooks appear to be increasingly unsustainable (Auerbach 
and Gale, 2009).
In this paper, we consider the evidence on the effects of discretion-
ary fiscal policy, paying particular attention to the current context. 
We begin by considering how the practice of discretionary fiscal pol-
icy has changed over time and argue that the return to activist policy 
predated the current recession. We then turn to the evidence on the 
effects of discretionary policy on economic activity, considering the 
variety of approaches found in the literature, including direct econo-
metric tests of the impact of stimulative policies on consumption and 
investment, as well as general equilibrium approaches to measuring 
the impact of taxes and government purchases. Finally, we look for 
lessons from the evidence from two important historical episodes: for 
the United States in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s.
In addressing discretionary fiscal policy, we are explicitly exclud-
ing from our discussion the use of automatic stabilizers, which has 
been subject to much less controversy over the years than discretion-
ary interventions. While automatic stabilizers may be an important Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  329
macroeconomic policy tool, recent policy activism suggests that they 
will, at least in some circumstances, be viewed by policymakers as 
insufficient on their own. 
II.    The Return of Activist Fiscal Policy
In a paper written seven years ago for this conference (Auerbach, 
2002), one of us argued that there was no evidence that the United 
States had increased its reliance on discretionary fiscal policy, contrary 
to what some had suggested to be happening in Europe. This conclu-
sion was based on analysis of actual policy changes, as reported by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), rather than on a more popu-
larly used measure based on changes in the full-employment surplus. 
Because the latter measure incorporates changes in the surplus that 
are attributable neither to policy nor to the state of the economy3 and 
that represent the phasing-in of policies adopted earlier, it provides a 
poor representation of the timing and magnitude of policy actions. 
Updating that paper’s analysis using more recent evidence, however, 
provides a different picture.
The data on policy changes for revenues, outlays (excluding inter-
est) and their difference, the primary surplus, come from the updates 
that CBO provides for its baseline revenue and expenditure forecasts 
for the federal budget, covering the current fiscal year and several 
future fiscal years. With each update, CBO estimates changes in pro-
jected revenues and expenditures due to policy actions. Using these 
updates, we derive a roughly semiannual series of projected changes 
in revenues and expenditures. Continuous data from CBO forecast 
revisions are available since summer 1984, with the last complete 
observation ending in the winter of 2009, just before the passage of 
the 2009 stimulus bill.
For each observation, as before, we measure the policy change 
in question (revenue, outlays, or surplus) as the discounted sum of 
annual policy changes adopted during the interval for the current 
and subsequent four fiscal years (relative to each year’s correspond-
ing measure of potential GDP), with the five weights normalized to 
sum to 1.4 The discount factor, as before, is 0.5, meaning that each   330  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
succeeding fiscal year’s policy change is accorded half the weight of 
the previous one. Variables are scaled by potential GDP.
Chart 1 displays the resulting series for changes in revenues and 
outlays. Also included in the figure is a partial measure of the policy 
changes for the second observation in 2009 (winter 2009 to summer 
2009), based on changes adopted through March 2009, including the 
February stimulus package—the largest changes in both revenues and 
outlays over the entire period. From the figure, it appears that dis-
cretionary policy was very active during the 1980s, very quiet during 
the Clinton administration, especially during the mid-1990s, and very 
active again during the past decade. But this figure does not account 
for changes in the factors driving policy, that is, whether the changes 
in activity are attributable to changes in the willingness to use discre-
tionary policy or simply to changes in the perceived need to use policy 
interventions. To distinguish between these two possible explanations, 
we estimate simple policy reaction functions, again repeated from the 
2002 paper. Explanatory variables are the projected annual budget sur-
pluses over the same five-year budget period, weighted using the same 
discounting process5, and the lagged value of the full-employment 
GDP gap from the prior quarter, as calculated by CBO. The latter 
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variable is included to determine whether discretionary policy actu-
ally has been countercyclical in nature—which some observers have 
doubted—and the former is included to account for the likely response 
to budgetary conditions, with the predicted coefficients of both vari-
ables being negative in explaining revenues and the surplus, and posi-
tive in explaining outlays. The coefficients’ absolute value measures the 
strength of the associated response.
Table 1 reports the results of this analysis. The first three columns 
of Table 1 show the estimates for the full sample period, with rev-
enues, non-interest outlays, and the primary surplus, respectively, 
as the dependent variables. Over the full sample period, both the 
GDP gap and the budget surplus exert a significant, negative impact 
on surplus-enhancing policy actions, indicating that policy has been 
both countercyclical in timing and responsive to budgetary condi-
tions. Both revenues and outlays respond in a consistent manner, 
with outlays accounting for a greater share of the overall response. 
The results indicate that policy changes adopted in a representative 
six-month period counter roughly one quarter of the GDP gap and 
offset a slightly higher fraction of the projected budget surplus.
Chart 2 repeats the series of policy changes shown in Chart 1, but 
now accompanied by the predicted policy changes based on the full-
sample estimates for revenues and outlays. As the figure shows quite 
clearly, a large part of the changes in the level of activity, from active 
to quiet to active again, are attributable to changes in the underlying 
forces driving policy. That is, assuming no change in the policy reac-
tion functions, the 1990s were a quiet period for policy because the 
reasons for intervention were absent. The intervention in early 2009 is 
not only the largest during the entire period, but also predicted to be.
But there is more to the recent resurgence of activity, as one sees 
by estimating the reaction functions separately for different time 
periods. The last three columns of Table 1 present evidence for the 
primary surplus for three sample periods of roughly equal length, 
corresponding respectively to the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.6  As previ-
ously discussed, there is no evidence from a comparison of results for 
the first two sub-periods—roughly those analyzed in the 2002 paper7 332  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
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—for an increasing reliance on discretionary fiscal policy. That is, 
the reduced level of activity observed is attributable to changes in the 
perceived need for policy responses. However, the estimates for the 
last period tell a quite different story, as responses to fiscal conditions, 
and especially to economic conditions, have strengthened.
This increased countercyclical policy activism is nicely illustrated 
by the differences in policy responses during the last four recessions. 
In August 1982, after a year in a deep recession that had several 
months left to run, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act (TEFRA), scaling back the large Reagan tax cuts that 
had been enacted just over one year earlier. Legislation over the same 
period cut near-term federal spending. During the next U.S. reces-
sion, in October 1990, a budget summit meeting of President Bush 
and Congressional leaders produced legislation aimed at reducing the 
deficit. In early 2002, in response to the 2001 recession that was not 
then known to have ended, Congress introduced “bonus deprecia-
tion,” the first use of countercyclical investment incentives since the 
1970s. And early 2008 saw the first round of fiscal stimulus during 
the current recession, adopted well before the recession’s depth could 
be anticipated. It does appear, then, that the stage was set for the 
Chart 2
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2009 stimulus package, even though the extreme conditions at the 
time made a substantial intervention much more likely. 
III.   Multipliers and Policy Lags 
Despite being adopted during a period of very weak economic per-
formance, the 2009 stimulus package encountered criticism on several 
fronts, which can be summarized by asking whether the package was 
sufficiently “timely, targeted, and temporary.”8  
First, there was concern that the policies, although adopted in Feb-
ruary 2009, would be implemented only gradually, with much of the 
impact coming after the recession was over and the recovery under-
way. While the concern about policy lags is one of the standard criti-
cisms of countercyclical fiscal policy, the concern seems a little less 
relevant in the present context, if projections of a long and slow re-
covery are to be believed. Chart 3 shows the path for GDP relative to 
potential as projected in March by CBO, for the baseline without the 
February stimulus package and for two scenarios with the fiscal pack-
age, corresponding to CBO’s perceived range of multiplier estimates 
for the package’s different components. Under these projections, the 
economy would not reach its potential until 2014, and the stimu-
lus package would simply speed the rate of approach, even under 
the most optimistic assumptions about multiplier size. Thus, while 
more rapid implementation might still have been preferred, the risk 
of destabilizing the economy by injecting stimulus in an overheating 
economy seems to be less of an issue.
The desire to keep the package temporary is motivated by concerns 
about the long-term budget outlook. As we have discussed elsewhere 
(Auerbach and Gale 2009), the contribution of the stimulus to the 
long-term U.S. fiscal problem is minimal, if one assumes that the pro-
visions of the stimulus are temporary, as enacted. Indeed, the stimu-
lus package contributes less to the current-year deficit than does the 
recession itself, through automatic stabilizers working primarily on 
the tax side. Of course, the Obama administration has already sup-
ported, through its budget proposals, a plan to extend an important 
part of the stimulus package—the Making Work Pay tax credit. But 
this proposal dates back to early in the presidential campaign, and so Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  335
Chart 3
Estimated Impact of 2009 Fiscal Stimulus
has little if anything to do with the passage of the stimulus package. 
On the other hand, the inclusion in the stimulus package of a provi-
sion designed originally without the recession in mind does highlight 
the third set of criticisms of the stimulus package: that it was not 
well-targeted to provide the strongest fiscal stimulus per dollar of rev-
enue loss or spending increase. Some focused on the composition of 
the package, questioning whether projects that were “shovel-ready” 
were likely to be of high value to society and whether the particular 
tax cuts adopted were the right ones from a longer-term perspective. 
But most concerns related to the policy’s macroeconomic effects.
How well-targeted the package was, and the size of the resulting 
policy multipliers, is a key area of controversy. Even before the stimu-
lus package was adopted, the Obama administration released a docu-
ment written by two of its economists (Romer and Bernstein, 2009) 
estimating the impact of a potential stimulus plan on employment. 
These projections were based on estimates of multipliers for govern-
ment purchases and tax cuts averaged over those from the Fed’s FRB/
US model and a private forecasting model. The resulting multiplier for 
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a permanent change in government purchases was about 1.5, reached 
after about a year; the corresponding multiplier for tax cuts (other 
than investment incentives) was about 1.0, with about three-fourths 
of the impact reached after one year and the full impact reached af-
ter two years. These multipliers are consistent with those assumed by 
CBO (2009a, Table 1) in making its projections, in that both the gov-
ernment-spending multiplier and the tax-cut multiplier fall roughly 
midway between the upper and lower bounds CBO lists for its high-
multiplier and low-multiplier scenarios. But many economists outside 
of government (e.g., Barro, 2009; Cogan, et al. 2009; Leeper, et al. 
2009) have recently challenged these or similar estimates, arguing that 
the assumed multipliers are too large. 
How should one calculate government policy multipliers? The lit-
erature has not settled on a single preferred method, so the evidence 
comes from a variety of approaches. For some policies, such as tax 
cuts provided to households, we have ample data at the individual 
level, and can use these data to estimate household responses to tax 
changes, such as the rebates introduced in 2008 and the tax credits 
of 2009. Similar approaches have been applied in estimating the im-
pact of tax incentives on investment, although this line of research 
has proved more challenging because of the greater complexity of the 
likely effects. We review the estimates from both of these literatures 
in some detail below. These approaches, however, look only at direct 
responses to tax changes and not the impact on economic activity 
overall, which could be smaller or larger than the direct effects on 
consumption or investment. As a result, models are needed that take 
account of the various additional channels through which tax cuts, 
as well as increases in government purchases or transfer payments, 
affect GDP and its components. There have been various approaches 
to the development of such models, and we review these develop-
ments and their predictions below, after discussing the results regard-
ing the direct effects of tax policy.
III.A.   Evidence from Household Responses to Tax Cuts
Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables, durables, and 
services currently account for about 70 percent of GDP, rising from 
between 60 and 65 percent during much of the post-war period. As Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  337
a result, tax cuts to stimulate consumption have long been a staple of 
government efforts to stimulate the economy. These efforts, in turn, 
have generated a substantial literature that offers several “stylized” re-
sults about the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of tax cuts. 
First, consistent with standard life-cycle and permanent-income 
models, most of the evidence suggests that household consumption 
responds more vigorously to tax changes that are plausibly expected 
to be longer-lasting (“permanent”) than to changes that are plau-
sibly expected to be shorter-lasting (“temporary”). Using aggregate 
consumption data, Blinder (1981), Blinder and Deaton (1985), and 
Poterba (1988) examine the effects of two temporary policies—the 
1975 income tax rebate and the 1968 surtax. Blinder finds that the 
current-period MPC is smaller for a temporary tax cut than a per-
manent cut, but that some of the difference is made up in subse-
quent periods. Blinder and Deaton find almost no contemporaneous 
consumption out of temporary income tax cuts. Poterba finds that 
between 12 percent and 24 percent of the 1975 rebate was spent in 
the month the rebate is received. 
Microeconomic studies of the longer-lasting shifts in tax policy 
enacted in 1981 and 2001 have produced larger estimated MPCs. 
Souleles (2002) uses Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data to 
show that the MPC out of the 1981 tax cuts was as high as 0.9. John-
son, Parker and Souleles (JPS 2006) use CEX data to measure the 
effect of the 2001 tax “rebate” on consumption, exploiting the time 
variation across households regarding when the rebates were received.9 
Their central finding is that households spent 20 to 40 percent of 
the funds on nondurable goods during the first three-month period 
after receipt of the rebate, and a total of 69 percent over the first two 
quarters after receipt. These results are sensitive to specification, how-
ever. Hamilton (2008) replicates the JPS findings and shows that the 
estimated MPC falls to 45 percent if just 20 outliers, out of a sample 
of 13,000, are removed. The outliers are households with the 10 most 
positive and 10 most negative changes in quarterly consumption. 
Each change exceeds $13,000 in absolute value and could not pos-
sibly have been generated by the rebates, which were capped at $600. 338  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
Additional trimming of the sample reduces the coefficient further, 
and the MPC estimated from a median regression is about 30 percent. 
A second stylized finding, in addition to differences in MPCs out of 
temporary versus permanent tax cuts, is that household responses to 
a given tax cut are heterogeneous, with borrowing constraints materi-
ally affecting the MPC. In theory, borrowing-constrained households 
should have a larger MPC out of tax cuts than other households do, 
and low- and middle-income households are more likely to be con-
strained than upper-income households. As a result, tax cuts targeted 
toward lower- and moderate-income households should have a larger 
“bang for the buck.” In practice, most of the evidence from the best 
studies is consistent with this view. JPS find that households with low 
income and few liquid assets have a higher MPC out of the 2001 tax 
cuts than those with high income or a greater amount of liquid as-
sets. Broda and Parker (2008) obtain similar results for the 2008 tax 
cut. Perhaps the most compelling evidence on the role of borrowing 
constraints comes from Agarwal, et al. (2004), who examine monthly 
data on credit card accounts in conjunction with the 2001 tax cut. 
They show that households with lower credit card limits and/or those 
who have balances above 90 percent of their credit limit have a signifi-
cantly stronger MPC (looking at credit-card financed purchases only) 
out of the 2001 tax cut than do other households. Bertrand and Morse 
(2009) find that pay-day loan holders, who are likely to be borrow-
ing-constrained, have a very low propensity to use their rebates to pay 
down existing debt, with the implication that the marginal propensity 
to consume the rebate is quite high among this group.10
Comparing estimated MPCs for the 2001 and the 2008 tax cuts 
provides interesting perspectives on the two issues noted above—
the role of tax cut permanence and of heterogeneous responses. The 
2001 rebate was clearly—even at the time of enactment—part of 
a longer-lasting tax cut, whereas the 2008 rebate was very explic-
itly a one-time event. On the other hand, the 2001 rebate went to 
all income groups and was not refundable, whereas the 2008 rebate 
was limited to low- and middle-income households and was refund-
able. The first difference should raise the MPC out of the 2001 re-
bate relative to 2008, the second difference should reduce it. In fact,   Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  339
estimated MPCs are not significantly different for the two tax cuts. 
For example, Broda and Parker (2008) examine micro data on house-
hold purchases and find that households consumed about 20 percent 
of the rebate in the first month after receiving it, a rate of consump-
tion that is consistent with the MPC out of the 2001 tax cuts re-
ported in JPS. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003, 2009) report the results 
of asking respondents in phone surveys how they intend to use the 
2001 and 2008 tax cuts, respectively, and report a remarkable simi-
larity in overall responses for the two tax cuts. For example, 21.8 per-
cent of households say they would mostly spend the 2001 tax cuts, 
compared to 19.9 percent for the 2008 tax cut. 
Finally, aggregate data show personal saving spiking and personal 
consumption relatively smooth during the months when rebates 
were paid in both 2001 and 2008 (Feldstein, 2009; Shapiro and 
Slemrod, 2009; and Taylorm, 2009). The last finding is consistent 
with the responses to the 2001 and 2008 rebates being similar, but 
does not necessarily imply that the MPC out of each was negligible. 
Chart 4 replicates a figure from CBO (2009b) that shows that if the 
two-quarter MPC out of the 2008 tax cut were 40 percent, and the 
spending occurred over a six-month period, the resulting time path 
for consumption looks remarkably smooth relative to income. 
A third important finding from the literature is that the impact 
of tax changes on consumer spending tends to occur when the pol-
icy change is implemented, not when it is enacted or credibly an-
nounced (in contrast to investment behavior, summarized below). 
There is both general and tax-specific evidence that the timing of in-
come matters for consumption. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) show 
that aggregate consumption responds to current disposable income. 
Likewise, Wilcox (1989) shows that households raise their aggregate 
spending upon receipt of Social Security benefit increases. Using mi-
cro data, Parker (1999) shows that households’ expenditures on non-
durable goods rise in the months of the year after they have met their 
Social Security payroll tax cap and their take-home pay rises. Souleles 
(1999) shows that household consumption rises upon receipt of a 
tax refund, but not earlier, even though the value of the refund can 
presumably be known in advance.340  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
The evidence from tax cuts is equally strong. Poterba (1988) shows 
that aggregate consumer spending did not respond in the months sur-
rounding the announcement of several major tax cuts. Souleles (2002) 
shows that the MPC out of the Reagan tax cuts, which eventually 
reached 0.9 as noted above, rose during the second and third phase-
ins of the tax cuts, which were pre-announced. Blinder and Deaton 
(1985) find similar results in the aggregate data. Johnson, Parker, and 
Souleles (2006) and Broda and Parker (2008) exploit the fact that the 
2001 and 2008 tax cuts were received by different households at dif-
ferent times to show that consumption only rose after the tax cut had 
been received.11  
The findings summarized above are generally consistent with stan-
dard optimizing behavior, with some households facing borrowing 
constraints (though the findings for the timing of the consumption 
response are also consistent with mental accounting or myopia). Other 
results suggest the importance of an additional set of factors, namely 
Chart 4
Consumption and Income With and Without Rebates Provided 
Under the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2009b).
Note: The cumulative area between lines showing consumption  (personal spending) with and without the effects 
fo rebates is 40 percent of the area between the lines showing income with and without the rebates. In the chart, it 
is assumed that the 40 percent of rebates is spent over six months, according to this pattern: 15 percentage points 
in the first month and 5 percentage points in each subsequent month. On the basis of those assumptions, CBO 
estimates that the rebates added 2.3 percent (at an annual rate) to the growth of consumption in the second quarter 
of 2008 and 0.2 percent in the third quarter but—because of those effects—reduced the growth of consumption by 
1.0 percent in the fourth quarter.
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the way tax cuts are described and delivered, holding budget constraints 
constant. These results are consistent with a growing literature indicat-
ing that framing, presentation, and other factors such as default speci-
fications have a significant influence on saving behavior, and therefore 
are relevant for the simple reason that saving and consumption choices 
are closely linked.12   
For example, there is some evidence that adjustments to withhold-
ing that do not represent tax cuts can affect consumption. Shapiro and 
Slemrod (1995) report the results of a phone survey asking respon-
dents how they reacted to the 1992 changes in withholding, which 
changed the timing of tax payments but not overall tax liability. The 
respondents were surveyed one to two months after their changes in 
withholding occurred. One question summarized the policy change, 
specifying that respondents’ overall tax burden would not change, 
and then asked whether they planned to mostly save, mostly spend, 
or mostly pay down debt with their increased take-home pay. More 
than 40 percent said they planned to spend the extra cash. There are, 
of course, obvious reliability questions relating to asking people what 
they did rather than measuring their actions.13  Nevertheless, it seems 
striking that so many respondents would indicate plans to spend the 
extra, temporary cash, and it is consistent with the evidence above on 
how household spending responds to disposable income.14 
Although there is little evidence on the subject, it is interesting to 
speculate on how the magnitude of the tax cut affects the propensity 
to consume the funds. Hsieh (2003) shows that the annual payments 
that Alaskan residents receive under the Alaska Permanent Fund (as 
dividends from the state’s oil royalties) have little effect on their im-
mediate consumption. These payments are typically large relative to 
the rebates and tax cuts discussed above. After examining several fac-
tors, Hsieh concludes that the effects of fiscal policy on consumption 
may in fact depend on the size of the transfer or tax cut, as well as 
the transparency of the policy. Similar results occur in analysis of 
households’ disposition of pre-retirement lump-sum distributions 
(LSDs):  larger distributions are more likely to be saved (Burman, 
Coe and Gale, 2001). In addition, respondents in at least one experi-
ment report that they would be more likely to spend tax cuts given as   342  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
high-frequency, small increases in after-tax earnings than the same 
amount given as a one-time lump-sum (Chambers and Spencer, 
2008). In all of these cases, the results suggest households may be 
more disposed to respond consistently with life-cycle planning when 
the amount at stake is significant, and may otherwise exhibit higher 
spending propensities than one would expect among households 
who are not liquidity-constrained. 
In light of these considerations, two aspects of the tax cuts enacted 
in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 are note-
worthy. First, the cuts are part of a longer-term agenda for tax change. 
The Obama administration has already made clear its intent to make 
permanent the Make Work Pay credit. Second, the tax cuts are be-
ing delivered through changes in withholding, rather than one-time, 
lump-sum payments. On the basis of the analysis above, both features 
should serve to increase the MPC out of the stimulus package.
III.B.   Evidence from Firm Responses to Investment Incentives
Gross private domestic investment is a smaller share of GDP than 
consumption (typically averaging about 20 percent of output) but 
is far more sensitive to cyclical conditions and so takes on elevated 
significance as a potential way to stimulate the economy. Just as one 
can estimate the household consumption responses to temporary tax 
rebates, one can use changes in investment incentives to estimate the 
responsiveness of business fixed investment. But estimating invest-
ment responses is a considerably more challenging exercise, for at 
least two reasons.
First, we have few natural experiments to analyze on the investment 
front. As noted in Auerbach (2009), the use of investment incentives 
for countercyclical policy disappeared from the U.S. landscape in the 
1970s and reappeared only in 2002. While there were other changes in 
tax policy that affected investment, notably in 1981 and 1986, these 
were intended as long-run changes and so would be expected to have 
had different impacts on investment, just as permanent tax cuts would 
have a different influence on household consumption than temporary 
ones (although with a different ordering here, temporary incentives Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  343
having a larger predicted impact than permanent ones because of the 
incentive to accelerate investment to qualify for incentives). 
Second, specifying the behavior of investment is more difficult, 
both because of the interaction of different tax provisions (notably 
those that affect financial policy and that limit the ability of firms 
to utilize tax deductions) and because modeling the behavior of this 
very volatile component of output has proved more challenging than 
modeling consumption.
A series of studies has focused on the effects of tax changes on the 
composition of business fixed investment, primarily using panel data 
on firms, industries or asset categories. These studies (for example, 
Auerbach and Hassett, 1991, and Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard, 
1994) relate changes in investment to changes in the Hall-Jorgenson 
user cost of capital, which incorporates changes in tax policy vari-
ables. The studies provide ample evidence that changes in the user 
cost of capital do influence the pattern of investment, i.e., that the 
mix of investment is responsive to relative changes in the user cost of 
capital. This literature suggests an elasticity of equipment investment 
with respect to the user cost ranging between -0.5 and -1.0 (Hassett 
and Hubbard, 2002). However, there are several issues that make the 
use of such estimates difficult to translate into predicted effects for 
the recent U.S. investment incentives.
First, the estimates are based primarily on variations from tax reforms, 
which by their nature typically involve changes to more tax parameters 
than do stimulus policies (making inference more difficult), are not 
necessarily undertaken during periods of recession, and are typically 
expected to be of longer duration (making inference from these events 
less relevant) than the various rounds of bonus depreciation. Second, 
the relevance of cash flow as a factor explaining investment remains 
unresolved, and the importance of this factor might easily be much 
greater during a recession, particularly the most recent one. Third, the 
cyclical sensitivity of net operating losses among firms, which appears 
to have become more significant in the past decade (Altshuler, et al. 
2009), means that tax incentives provided through an acceleration of 
deductions against taxable income may have weaker effects in recession 
than in normal times. Finally, these empirical estimates are informative 344  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
primarily about the composition of investment, rather than the level 
of investment, with responsiveness identified in relation to differential 
changes in investment incentives. While one can use these estimated 
elasticities to make inferences about aggregate responses, there are vari-
ety of reasons why the two might differ.
There have been some attempts at estimating the actual responses 
of investment to the bonus depreciations incentives of 2002-2004. 
Perhaps the most careful study is that of House and Shapiro (2008). 
Using a methodology related to that already discussed, they find 
that the composition of investment did shift from non-qualifying 
investment (in this instance, most structures) to qualifying invest-
ment (equipment investment plus some shorter-lived structures). As 
discussed, this methodology is not designed to measure aggregate re-
sponses, although doing so would have been particularly difficult in 
the case of bonus depreciation, given that the incentive effects were 
rather small overall and hence the predicted increases in aggregate 
investment difficult to observe (Desai and Goolsbee, 2004).
One interesting result in the House-Shapiro analysis is that re-
sponses of investment to the 2002 introduction of bonus deprecia-
tion appeared to begin during the last quarter of 2001 and the first 
quarter of 2002, a period ultimately covered retroactively by the 2002 
legislation. Thus, firms expected that investment incentives would be 
enacted and that investment undertaken during this interval would 
be covered. This is not entirely surprising, since proposals for invest-
ment incentives began circulating shortly after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (the date ultimately used to mark the beginning 
of the retroactive application period). But the announcement effect 
could just as easily have been perverse—it could have reduced invest-
ment in the time between 9/11 and the enactment of the law—had 
investor anticipations of a tax incentive not included expectations of 
retroactive application, for then firms would have been encouraged 
to await actual implementation (or at least clarification with respect 
to dates) before investing.
The predictability of investment incentives, then, should be of much 
greater concern than the predictability of individual tax rebates. While 
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expectation of investment incentives can have the opposite effect. And, 
historically, the introduction of investment incentives is to a considerable 
extent predictable. This is illustrated in Table 2 and Chart 5, reproduced 
from Auerbach (2009). The table provides estimates of an ordered pro-
bit model explaining changes in the user cost of capital using annual 
data from 1962 through 2008. The dependent variable takes on three 
possible values, depending on whether tax policy adopted in that year 
increased, decreased, or neither increased nor decreased the user cost 
by at least 0.5 percentage points. Explanatory variables are the lagged 
GDP gap, the lagged federal budget surplus, and the lagged change in 
equipment investment, scaled by potential GDP. Chart 5 plots the ac-
tual series of policy changes against predicted changes, as measured by 
the difference between the probabilities of an increase and of a decrease. 
The table suggests that government policy changes can be predicted to 
a considerable extent, although there does appear to have been unusual 
forbearance during the period from 1987 through 2001. The years since 
have seen stronger reasons for policy changes  but also changes that were 
very predictable, suggesting again that incentives to invest in the years 
just prior to 2002 and 2008 could have been compromised considerably 
had investors not expected retroactive implementation.
In summary, tax incentives affect investment, with the composi-
tional effects more easily identified than the aggregate effects. But 
too little attention has been given to the announcement effects of 
policy and the fact that conditions governing investment in recession 
(particularly cash-flow constraints and tax losses) may produce quite 
different investment responses to temporary tax cuts than would be 
predicted using models based on responses to long-term tax reforms 
adopted under more normal circumstances.
III.C.   Evidence from Economy-Wide Models 
Although the effects on individual components of output are of   
interest, perhaps the most important question regarding the effective-
ness of fiscal stimulus is the effect of different policies on overall out-
put, taking into account not only the direct effects, but also the indirect   
effects and private sector responses. Generally, three types of models have 
been used for such analysis, with differing strengths and weaknesses. 346  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
Table 2
Ordered Probit Analysis of Changes in the 
User Cost of Capital, 1962-2008
(standard errors in parentheses)
Chart 5
Investment Policy Changes: Actual and Predicted
Independent Variable Coefficient
Constant 0.654
(0.367)
GDP Gap (-1) -27.073
(11.303)
Surplus (-1) -31.800
(15.212)
Δ Equipment Investment (-1) 182.978
(61.372)
Scaled R2 .423
Number of  Observations 47
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III.C.i. Three Approaches 
Large-scale macroeconomic models encompass several equations   
accounting for relevant prices and quantities in different sectors of the 
economy and relating these prices and quantities to each other and 
to government policy variables. Many government-reported multi-
plier estimates, including those of Romer and Bernstein (2009) and 
CBO (2009a) mentioned above, are based on such models, and they 
remain a workhorse for analysis within government and private in-
dustry. Many prominent large-scale models predict that the stimulus 
package passed in early 2009 materially affected economic growth in 
second and third quarters of 2009 (Council of Economic Advisers, 
2009, Table 7). While the large-scale models provide considerable de-
tail regarding the channels through which policy can operate, their 
theoretical grounding has been challenged.
A second approach is to estimate models of a more reduced-form 
nature, relating changes in output to changes in taxes15 and govern-
ment purchases, without specifying the channels through which the 
effects occur. Some of this work uses single-equation methods, but 
the more standard framework for this approach is the structural vec-
tor autoregression (SVAR), with the structure being provided in the 
form of assumptions that make possible the identification of fiscal 
policy shocks and their effects. Analyses using SVARs tend to find 
that changes in taxes and government purchases can significantly in-
fluence output, after accounting for economy-wide interactions and 
responses to the initial stimulus. But the implications for the current 
downturn are not as clear, because, as reduced-form models, SVARs 
cannot address the effects of policies that were not observed in-sam-
ple, nor can they address how the economic response to a given policy 
varies with economic conditions that were not observed in-sample. 
A third approach specifies dynamic equilibrium models, such as 
Baxter and King (1993). More recent analyses in this vein typically in-
clude stochastic elements and are referred to as DSGE (dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium) models, including recent contributions 
by Cogan, et al. (2009), and Leeper, et al. (2009). The hallmark of this 
approach is a relatively small number of equations based tightly on 
microeconomic theory, with some parameters derived from empirical 348  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
estimates and others calibrated to make the model consistent with ob-
served macroeconomic relationships. Because DSGE models specify 
the full economic structure, they are able to analyze a wide range of 
policies and policy environments that is not limited by historical ex-
perience. As a result, there is an enormous variety of estimates of the 
impact of fiscal policy on economic activity. The DSGE approach, 
however, leans heavily on modeling assumptions that may or may not 
be valid regarding the stickiness of wages and prices, the prevalence of 
liquidity constraints, the rationality of agents, and so forth. 
Because of these differences in approach and in strengths and weak-
nesses, it is useful to compare the predictions obtained from different 
approaches. Where predictions are similar, we can have more confi-
dence in them, and when predictions differ, we can look further into 
the sources of such differences to help us decide where the strength of 
the evidence lies. In our discussion below, we focus on the estimates 
of some key policy issues from the SVAR literature and relate these to 
findings from analyses that employ DSGE methods. 
III.C.ii. Effects of Taxes and Purchases on Output  
The SVAR augments the simple VAR methodology of regress-
ing output and other aggregates on lagged values of themselves and 
policy variables of interest with some method of identifying policy 
shocks, changes in current policy variables that are attributable to 
actual changes in policy rather than to endogenous responses to eco-
nomic conditions. Thus, the literature has focused on both the SVAR 
specification and the choice of identifying assumption in attempting 
to obtain more convincing multiplier estimates. 
An important early contribution in the literature, by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), provides estimates of multipliers for both gov-
ernment purchases and taxes, using the identifying assumption that 
these variables could respond to output within a quarter (the period 
of observation) only through automatic provisions, not discretionary 
policy. Thus, controlling for such automatic response, which could 
be estimated directly, the fiscal shocks within a period could be treat-
ed as exogenous. Based on such a methodology, Blanchard and Pe-
rotti estimate a GDP multiplier for government purchases of about Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  349
0.5 after one year, with longer-term multipliers depending on model 
specification because of differences in the estimated permanence of 
policies. That is, the short-term multipliers imply a net crowding 
out of components of GDP other than the government purchases 
themselves. Estimates of tax-cut multipliers are slightly larger, closer 
to 1.0 after a year.
As noted above, a central concern with SVARs is the identification 
of policy shocks. For example, a change in taxes or spending identi-
fied by the Blanchard-Perotti methodology as a policy shock might 
have been anticipated by individuals (even if not by the economic 
model), or it might not have been a policy change at all (for example, 
because it might represent the phase-in of policy enacted earlier). 
Thus, one line of research extending the basic SVAR approach has 
been to identify policy changes through a narrative approach, ap-
plying additional information on policy decisions to help identify 
exogenous policy changes, rather than treating as exogenous surprises 
those changes not predicted by the SVAR itself. 
Using military spending buildups as an important source of varia-
tion in government purchases, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) are able 
to estimate the impact of these buildups on GDP and its other com-
ponents. More recently, Ramey (2008) provides a more complete 
set of data on such shocks and emphasizes the importance of distin-
guishing the announcement dates of policy changes from their dates 
of implementation. Using such a series based on actual policy an-
nouncements, she estimates an output multiplier after four quarters 
of about 0.7. 
In a recent review of this and other recent papers in the litera-
ture, Hall (2009) concludes that the GDP multiplier of government 
purchases is probably at least 0.5 when identification is based on 
military buildups, and that a range of 0.5 to 1.0 is consistent with 
the evidence from the literature that uses the alternative identifi-
cation approaches discussed above. After reviewing the alternative 
DSGE modeling approaches that might be reasonable to adopt, he   
concludes that plausible DSGE models can generate results with-
in this range. One important implication of this conclusion of a   350  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
multiplier below 1.0 is that other components of GDP fall in   
response to the increase in government purchases.
On the tax side, the narrative approach to identifying policy shocks 
has been introduced by Romer and Romer (2007), who used the same 
approach in earlier analysis identifying monetary policy shocks. They 
argue that the multipliers of tax changes estimated using other ap-
proaches are likely to underestimate tax policy multipliers by treating 
as exogenous many policy changes that were actually responding to 
economic conditions or government purchases. Using their narrative 
approach to identify policy changes that were arguably independent of 
such other factors, they find a GDP tax-cut multiplier of about 1 after 
four quarters but rising to 3 after 10 quarters. This very large multi-
plier is associated with an enormous impact on investment. While the 
result is striking, it is one that merits further investigation.16  
III.C.iii. Limitations of SVARs
Although the narrative approach probably yields better estimates 
of true policy surprises than the standard SVAR approach, both ap-
proaches are limited in certain critical respects—stemming from the 
reduced-form nature of the model—especially if the goal is to ap-
ply historical estimates to the current downturn. First, the models 
cannot be used to examine the economy’s responses to automatic 
stabilizers or to any already-operating rules that relate activist fiscal 
policy to economic conditions. The effects of both types of policies 
are “baked in” to the coefficient estimates themselves in some un-
specified manner. 
Second, SVARs can measure only the multipliers of activist poli-
cies that deviated from standard policy responses to economic condi-
tions within the sample period and can only estimate the effects of 
those policies as they were actually adopted. For example, if shocks 
to government purchases or taxes tended to be short-lived, then we 
cannot draw direct inferences about the effects of more permanent 
shocks. New tax changes differing in composition—with respect to 
the firms or households targeted, or with a different mix of income 
and substitution effects—from those examined in-sample could 
well have different multipliers than those estimated. This concern is   Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  351
especially important in light of the fact that most of the estimates of 
the effects of government purchases actually relate to defense spend-
ing and are based heavily—almost exclusively—on the experience 
during the Korean War, when taxes were raised and defense spending 
rose permanently as the Cold War began (Hall, 2009). As a result, 
they do not necessarily apply very well to the recently-enacted tem-
porary increases in non-defense spending, which were accompanied 
by reductions in taxes and took place in a severe economic downturn. 
Third, SVARs can only estimate the effects of policy interventions 
under the economic conditions prevailing within the sample, and it is 
worth emphasizing again that the multiplier effects of different poli-
cies could vary substantially with economic conditions. Investment 
incentives that might be strong in a boom might be ineffectual in a 
period of tight credit and net operating losses. Tax cuts for house-
holds might have a larger impact during periods in which liquid-
ity constraints bind more tightly. Government spending might have 
larger multipliers during periods, like the present, when the zero-in-
terest rate bound is binding, as suggested by recent analyses based on 
DSGE models (Eggertsson, 2008a; Christiano, et al. 2009).17  But 
fiscal expansions may have smaller impacts during periods, again like 
the present, when long-term budget shortfalls are salient. The upshot 
of these concerns is that relying on truly exogenous changes in gov-
ernment purchases and taxes, as in the narrative approach, limits our 
ability to estimate such state-dependent multipliers, because it rules 
out estimating the effects of policies adopted explicitly as countercy-
clical measures. 
III.C.iv. Short-Term Stimulus with Long-Term Deficits 
Although reviewing the vast literature on fiscal impacts is beyond 
the scope of this paper, in this section we highlight an issue that 
is particularly relevant in the current economic situation—how the 
presence of long-term deficits alters the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. 
There are many reasons to think fiscal policies would have different 
effects if they are adopted during a period of fiscal stress than they 
would otherwise. There is an extensive literature, consisting of both 
theoretical and empirical contributions, arguing that contractionary 
fiscal policy adopted during periods of budget stress can even have an 352  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
expansionary effect on output, essentially by shifting the economy’s 
trajectory away from one that could be very constraining for produc-
tive activity because of high marginal tax rates or economic disrup-
tions. Indeed, this notion was a cornerstone of what has come to be 
called “Rubinomics” during the Clinton administration in support 
of a sustained program of fiscal discipline.
The empirical evidence, based on panel data for OECD countries, 
does suggest that fiscal consolidations have less contractionary effects 
when adopted under fiscal stress, as measured by high debt and pro-
jected government spending relative to GDP (Perotti, 1999). Analy-
sis based on OECD data also indicates that fiscal contractions are 
more expansionary when implemented through cuts in government 
spending, as one might expect given the potential damage from re-
liance on higher marginal tax rates (Ardagna, 2004). One channel 
through which the differing effects of fiscal policy under different 
initial conditions may occur is through expectations of how the defi-
cit resulting from a stimulus will be closed in the future. Several re-
cent papers utilizing the DSGE modeling approach address this issue 
with mixed results (Corsetti, et al. 2009; Davig and Leeper, 2009; 
Leeper, et al. 2009). 
Thus far, this literature identifies fiscal shocks without reference to 
the type of auxiliary information utilized in the narrative approaches 
of Romer and Romer (2007) and Ramey (2008), and so the interpre-
tation of the resulting multipliers is subject to the same caveats that 
apply to those from the basic SVAR literature. That is, we do not 
know what information these fiscal shocks provided to agents in the 
economy. Moreover, we have little information about situations like 
the United States now faces, in which the current debt-GDP ratio is 
not extraordinarily high by international standards, and the most se-
rious fiscal problem involves very large unfunded liabilities that will 
not show up in government spending for several years. 
IV.   Two Case Studies: The Great Depression and the  
  Lost Decade
Most of the evidence discussed above comes from what might be 
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say that the typical U.S. post-war recession was induced largely by 
Federal Reserve tightening, was relatively short in duration, and did 
not involve the collapse of financial intermediation, the presence of 
nominal interest rates near zero, or deflation. The experiences of the 
U.S. economy in the 1930s and the Japanese economy in the 1990s 
were quite different, however. In each case, the bursting of an asset 
bubble followed by weakening in the financial intermediation system 
(among other things) led to deflation and a prolonged decline in 
output, punctuated by nominal interest rates approaching zero. As 
we have emphasized above, the size and timing of multiplier effects 
are likely to be sensitive to the structure and state of the economy, 
other contemporaneous policies, expectations, and other factors. As 
a result, analysis of the effects of fiscal policy in the Great Depres-
sion and the Lost Decade can provide additional evidence beyond 
the consumption, investment, and SVAR literatures surveyed above. 
Lessons from these two historical episodes may be particularly timely 
given their structural similarities to the current downturn. 
IV.A.   The Great Depression 
The Great Depression actually consisted of two sharp downturns 
with recoveries after each. From 1929 to 1933, the economy con-
tracted strongly: Output fell by 35 percent and unemployment rose 
by 22 percentage points to 25 percent. Starting in 1933, a strong re-
covery ensued; real GNP grew by 33 percent through 1937, at which 
time unemployment had fallen to 14 percent. In 1938, the economy 
fell back in recession, with output dropping by 5 percent and un-
employment rising to 19 percent. Beginning in 1939, a spectacu-
larly strong recovery occurred, with output growing by 49 percent 
through 1942, at which time the unemployment rate had fallen to 
less than 5 percent, the economy had returned to full employment, 
and the massive U.S. mobilization for World War II was well un-
derway. Looking at the period as a whole, output did not return to 
its 1929 level until 1937, after which it dropped again, and did not 
attain its pre-1929 trend level until 1942.18  
Sorting out the role of fiscal policy in these remarkable economic 
gyrations is not a simple task, in part because so many other things, 
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were changing over time as well. To control for the state of the econo-
my, Brown’s (1956) classic analysis focuses on the role of federal and 
state government fiscal policy in stimulating aggregate demand.19 He 
finds that in only two years in the 1930s—1931 and 1936—was 
total (federal, state, and local) government’s net contribution to ag-
gregate demand more than 0.6 percent of potential GDP larger than 
it had been in 1929. Each of these episodes coincided with one-time 
payments to veterans, not to systematic efforts to boost aggregate de-
mand. Moreover, each of those two years was followed by severe fiscal 
tightening. Between 1931 and 1933, the contribution of fiscal policy 
to aggregate demand decreased by over 3 percent of potential GNP. 
The federal government raised income tax rates in the Revenue Act 
of 1932, while state and local governments cut purchases and raised 
taxes further. Between 1936 and 1937, fiscal policy’s net impact on 
demand decreased by 2.5 percent of potential GNP, mainly due to 
federal tax increases—for Social Security and on undistributed prof-
its—and the end of the veterans’ payments enacted in 1936. By the 
end of the decade, even with output well below potential and the 
unemployment rate at 17 percent, the contribution of fiscal policy 
to aggregate demand in 1939 was just 0.6 percentage points larger 
than in 1929. 
One important result from Brown’s work is the small magnitude of 
the fiscal expansions, relative to the drop in output. As noted, output 
fell by 35 percent from 1929 to 1933. Hence, even if fiscal policy 
expansions were assigned a large multiplier of 2 (or 4), the economy 
would have needed deficits equal to an additional 18 (or 9) percent 
of GNP just to restore 1929 GNP levels during the depths of the 
Depression. These factors led to Brown’s oft-cited conclusion that 
“Fiscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery de-
vice in the ’thirties—not because it did not work, but because it was 
not tried.” A second, perhaps even more striking result is that fiscal   
tightening occurred during the two recessions in the 1930s and thus 
likely contributed to those downturns, especially the 1936-38 episode. 
Both of these findings—the second in particular—suggest the im-
portance of continuing concerns about the fiscal outlook as a con-
straint on stimulus policies. Indeed, even after the sharp downturn in Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  355
1929 and 1930, President Hoover continued to try (albeit unsuccess-
fully) to balance the budget, and Franklin Roosevelt ran for president 
in 1932 on a balanced budget platform, which was later abandoned 
after he took office (DeLong, 1996). Congress approved veterans’ 
payments in 1931 and 1936 over strong opposition from Presidents 
Hoover and Roosevelt. The tax increases were partially efforts to re-
store fiscal discipline and likely drove the economy back into reces-
sion.20 Although overall government spending did in fact rise more or 
less continuously and significantly over the decade, from 9.1 percent 
of GNP in 1929 to 14.5 percent in 1939, the reason fiscal stimulus 
on net was so small and was sometimes negative was that taxes rose as 
well, from 8.3 percent of GNP in 1929 to 11.4 percent in 1939, with 
particularly large federal tax increases in 1932 and 1937. 
While most of the research literature has subsequently focused on 
the New Deal and other federal initiatives, Brown’s work also high-
lights the important status of state and local governments in the con-
duct of aggregate fiscal policy. Subfederal governments provided the 
majority of government spending during the 1930s, but not only did 
they not help recovery, they likely hurt the economy. Between 1931 
and 1933, the impact of state and local government budgets on the 
economy declined by 0.5 percent of GDP, which probably helped to 
exacerbate the already steep downturn. State and local governments 
ran essentially balanced budgets the rest of the decade, providing 
almost no net stimulus during the 1933-1942 period. Federal spend-
ing accounted for almost all of the increase in spending over the pe-
riod, rising from less than 2 percent of GNP in 1929 to 6.5 percent 
in 1939.21
While there is no controversy regarding the numbers in Brown’s 
(1956) study, there are at least three prevailing views of the role fis-
cal policy played in ending the Depression. Romer (1992) attributes 
virtually no role to fiscal policy. She finds that the recovery from 
1933 to 1942 can be explained almost completely by an increase in 
the money supply (due to gold inflows and other factors) that helped 
refuel aggregate demand. Her estimates suggest that fiscal policy (as 
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not very expansionary and that the stimulative effect of fiscal policy 
changes was small. 
Vernon (1994) provides evidence for an intermediate role for fiscal 
policy—namely, that while fiscal policy did little to help the econ-
omy through 1939, the massive fiscal mobilization involved in the 
buildup to the Second World War played a key role in bringing the 
economy out of the clutches of the Depression. He notes that less 
than half of the overall recovery in output from 1933 to 1942 had 
been accomplished by 1940 and that fiscal policy—in particular, a 
pre-war run-up in defense spending—explains the lion’s share of out-
put growth from 1940 to 1942.  
Eggertsson (2008b) offers a significantly more sanguine view of 
fiscal policy, operating through an expectational channel, dating to 
the beginning of the recovery in 1933. He argues that in addition 
implementing a variety of policies, Roosevelt also effectively changed 
people’s view of the underlying policy paradigm to allow for deficit 
spending, inflation, and abolition of the gold standard. In Eggerts-
son’s model, this change in the policy paradigm was seen as credible 
(the rise in the deficit made future monetary expansion credible, for 
example) and hence made people more likely to spend their funds 
or invest productively rather than hoarding cash. This effect occurs 
above and beyond any direct effects of tax cuts and spending increas-
es. He estimates a multiplier of 3.4 for government spending, given 
the change in monetary policy and credible shifts in the underlying 
policy paradigm. As a result, even the relatively small changes in fiscal 
policy as noted by Brown could have significant effects. This work is 
consistent with other analyses that find that, when the interest rate is 
near zero, the government spending multiplier can be large (Eggerts-
son, 2006, 2008a; Christiano, et al. 2009).22 
IV.B.   The Lost Decade23
After growing at real annual rates exceeding 4 percent from 1970 
to 1991, spurred by high rates of saving and investment, the Japanese 
economy fell into a lengthy downturn that began during the second 
half of 1991 and continued through 1996. As in the Great Depres-
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for housing and stocks and a poorly functioning financial sector. In 
addition, Japan experienced overcapacity in key industries and an ex-
cess of saving in a traditionally relatively closed economy. As a result, 
credit contracted, investment collapsed, and nominal interest rates 
approached zero. Output growth averaged less than 1 percent per 
year, and Japan suffered the first sustained deflation in an industrial 
economy in the post-war period. By 1996, with the recession seem-
ingly ending and the economy enjoying a 3.6 percent growth rate, 
the government raised taxes. The economy then turned down again, 
due in part to the fiscal tightening, and roughly coincident with the 
onset of the Asian financial crisis. This led to stimulus packages in 
1998 and 1999 and a short-lived recovery. A significant recovery did 
not begin in earnest in 2003, however, after real output had grown at 
just 1.4 percent per year during the previous decade. 
Kuttner and Posen (2001, 2002) and Posen (1998, 2004) argue 
that strong, sustained fiscal stimulus would have been especially ap-
propriate in Japan during the 1990s, which was characterized by low 
interest rates, excess capacity, an abundance of cash and saving, and 
little demand for new investment. In these circumstances, monetary 
policy may well prove ineffective, and the impact of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand could be substantial, while the drawbacks—the 
potential crowd-out of private investment—are small. 
Although there was significant potential for expansionary fiscal 
policy, and although the conventional wisdom is that Japan stimu-
lated aggressively, Posen (2004) notes that “Japanese fiscal policy re-
mains widely, and occasionally wildly, mischaracterized.” The first 
issue, then, is characterizing Japanese fiscal policy during this period. 
Despite the conventional wisdom, Japanese fiscal expansion efforts 
were inconsistent, smaller than commonly thought, and undercut by 
a variety of factors.
In response to the initial and continuing downturn, Japan enacted a 
series of stimulus packages, including public works packages in 1992 
and 1993, and a temporary income tax reduction in 1994. However, 
the stimulus packages were simply not that large—amounting to a 
combined 2 percent of GDP—and the 1994 income tax reduction 
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impact—it was explicitly described as a temporary tax cut that would 
not only expire in 1997 but would be followed by tax increases. 
The income tax reduction did in fact end in 1997, accompanied 
by a 2 percentage point increase in the value-added tax (VAT) rate 
(from 3 percent to 5 percent), an increase in contribution rates for 
Social Security, and increases in medical copayments. The 1997 tax 
increases were explicitly efforts to control the medium- and long-
term fiscal outlook, were based on an optimistic economic outlook, 
and were further justified by notions of expansionary fiscal con-
solidation,  discussed above, and perhaps motivated in part by the 
American experience of raising taxes and cutting spending in 1993. 
The total fiscal tightening amounted to about 2 percent of GDP. 
However, the VAT rate increase on July 1, 1997, induced significant 
intertemporal substitution of consumption into the second quarter 
of 1997 and then “the economy fell off a cliff” (Fischer, 2001). This 
led to the introduction of two relatively large fiscal packages in 1998 
that included both increases in spending on public works and perma-
nent tax reductions for corporations and high-income individuals. In 
November 1999, another public works package was enacted. 
Fiscal policy efforts were marked not only by the inconsistent pat-
terns noted above, but by several other factors as well. First, Japan’s 
announced public spending on stimulus was much larger than what 
was actually implemented.24 The 1992-93 public works projects, for 
example, were announced to be 5 percent of GDP but turned out to 
be only 2 percent. Implementation and coordination issues in the re-
lationship between central and local governments in Japan are partly 
to blame; in particular, many of the public works spending projects 
required partial local government funding that did not come through 
(Ishii and Wada, 1998). Coordination issues at the central govern-
ment level also played a role, with Japanese bureaucrats playing an 
important role in blocking the government’s intentions.25  
Second, many of the provisions that were announced would not 
be expected to stimulate demand, or were already in the budget, and 
therefore not new. For example, the two 1998 fiscal packages are of-
ficially reported as totaling 10 percent of GDP, but experts indicate 
that only about 4 percent of GDP was “really” new stimulus. These Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  359
differences are an artifact of a complex and opaque budgeting system 
in Japan.26 Third, although it is difficult to find hard data, conven-
tional wisdom suggests that the public investment projects under-
taken with stimulus funding were notoriously wasteful and hence less 
productive than they might otherwise be.27  
In light of the analysis above, one may wonder about the source of 
the conventional wisdom that Japan aggressively stimulated. Kuttner 
and Posen (1998) attribute the confusion to the rapid and substantial 
rise in deficits in the early 1990s, which they report was interpreted 
as evidence of fiscal expansion by several prominent observers. They 
show, however, that the increase in deficits is due almost entirely to 
the automatic decline in revenue caused by the reduced economic 
output, not to aggressive discretionary stimulus. 
 Although fiscal policy was not tried on a consistent basis, it does 
appear to have had stimulative effects when employed, at least over 
the longer historical period for which estimates have been produced. 
Kuttner and Posen (2001, 2002) use a SVAR to assess the impact of 
fiscal policy on economic growth in Japan. They find that both tax 
cuts and spending increases are expansionary, with multipliers for Ja-
pan that are about as large as the multipliers estimated by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) for the United States, when calculated in the same 
manner, and with multipliers for tax cuts somewhat higher than for 
spending increases. Bayoumi (2001) also presents SVAR results for 
Japan, finding positive but short-lived effects of spending expansions, 
and positive, small, but longer-lasting effects of tax cuts.28  
Thus, the main conclusions from the Lost Decade are that fiscal 
policy in Japan may have been effective as stimulus when it was tried, 
but it was not tried in a strong and consistent manner—in part due 
to concerns about the fiscal outlook and in part because of confound-
ing effects that played out at the level of subnational governments or 
within the central government. The parallels with the conclusions in 
Brown (1956) about the 1930s are noteworthy.
V. Conclusions 
In response to the recent, sharp downturn in economic activity, the 
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world—enacted substantial fiscal stimulus. These policies continue a 
recent trend toward activist federal interventions, at least in the Unit-
ed States. Both the recent trend and the stimulus policies enacted this 
year highlight a number of key issues that the economics profession 
has addressed to varying degrees for decades. 
Our most fundamental conclusion is that, despite the large literature 
on these topics, the state of theory and evidence is not as “shovel-ready” 
as some of the stimulus projects were said to be. But much progress has 
been made. We have presented evidence that countercyclical policy 
has in fact adjusted within a time frame that is relevant for stabiliza-
tion purposes, and that stimulus policies can manipulate household 
consumption expenditures and business investment in ways that have 
significant macroeconomic impact on a timely basis. While it is true 
that these impacts will vary according to the nature of the policies and 
the state of the economy, the general finding that well-designed tax 
cuts can boost consumption and investment seems robust. 
While knowing the direct effects of taxes (or spending) on output 
is helpful, a critical but much less clear set of information surrounds 
the indirect effects, taking into account economy-wide expectations, 
reactions, and interactions. Results from the SVAR literature im-
ply that tax and spending changes have significant impact on the 
economy, albeit with some crowding out of other economic activity. 
The implications of these reduced-form results, however, are unclear 
and difficult to apply to the exceptional events and the new poli-
cies enacted during the last year. In contrast, DSGE models can be 
adapted to address the current economic environment and current 
policies, but in so doing, the models generate an enormously wide 
range of multipliers, from the essentially zero estimate provided by 
Cogan, et al. (2009) to estimates in the range of 3 to 4 provided by 
Christiano, et al. (2009). More generally, relatively small changes in 
parameter specification—within ranges that can not be ruled out by 
the empirical evidence—are capable of producing substantial shifts 
in estimated multipliers in the DSGE approach (Hall, 2009). 
An alternative source of information is the fiscal policy experience 
in the Great Depression and the Lost Decade. The remarkable fact 
is that sustained fiscal policy expansion was not attempted in either Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  361
episode. This could have been due to many factors, including putting 
concerns about the status of the budget ahead of concerns about the 
status of the economy, or believing that the best way for the govern-
ment to help would be to keep the fiscal house in order. If so, at 
the very least, one conclusion would be that attempts to balance the 
budget during those episodes did not succeed either in balancing the 
budget or in avoiding a prolonged, severe downturn. There is some 
evidence that fiscal policy in Japan was successful, when it was tried, 
but it is subject to the same caveats as those for the SVAR literature 
in general. Another interesting result from the two episodes is the 
extent to which subnational governments undid some of the effects 
of whatever federal stimulus did exist. All of these results have impli-
cations for current stimulus policies. 
With these findings in place, what can be said about the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act (ARRA) of 2009? We divide this 
issue into two parts:  Was a fiscal stimulus appropriate, and was ARRA 
the right fiscal stimulus? In addressing these questions, we note that the 
stimulus package has already been and will continue to be the subject 
of extensive research. While one should be able to offer clearer conclu-
sions with the benefit of more hindsight, policymakers need to reach 
conclusions on such questions even when—in fact, especially when—
the economics literature has not provided the final word on the topic. 
With that caveat, our provisional answers are “yes” and “sort of.”  
It is fair to say that if a fiscal stimulus were ever to be considered 
appropriate, the beginning of 2009 was such a time. Well over a year 
into the longest recession since the Depression, with several millions 
jobs lost, nominal interest rates at zero, fears of deflation, no signs of 
life in the major components of GDP, and the rest of the world in re-
cession and flooding the United States with capital, a fiscal expansion 
carried much smaller risks than the lack of one would have. 
As to the structure of the package, a large, diversified, phased-in 
stimulus was the right approach: large because the economy was in 
dire straits, diversified because there is uncertainty about the size of 
the multipliers attached to different parts of the package, phased-in 
because it is hard to implement everything all at once and there is a 
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Measured against the standard of “timely, targeted, and tempo-
rary,” ARRA gets reasonably good marks for being timely. About 
three-quarters of the effects take place in the first 18 months, a pe-
riod during which the economy is expected to remain far below full 
employment. While a faster implementation might have been desir-
able, the biggest avoidable delay probably was at the enactment stage, 
in which a lame-duck president and Congress deferred action for 
months even after the likelihood of intervention became high. 
The stimulus package was certainly not as well-targeted as it could 
have been, but there was some logic to its structure. The package 
was approximately one-third tax cuts, one-third aid to states and in-
dividuals, and one-third government investments. The tax cuts will 
stimulate aggregate demand, but could have been designed more ef-
fectively. The aid to individuals was based on humanitarian needs. 
The aid to states was well-advised. Because essentially all states ad-
here to some form of balanced-budget rule, economic declines that 
reduce state revenues force cuts in state spending. From the perspec-
tive of macroeconomic stabilization, reducing public spending dur-
ing a sharp downturn is counterproductive. The aid provided should 
offset some of the state and local spending cuts that would otherwise 
have occurred. The fact that state and local government spending 
and employment rose in the second quarter of 2009 is consistent 
with the view that the transfers have helped. Government invest-
ments were part of a longer-term Obama administration agenda and 
are probably not best evaluated solely as stimulus. 
Aside from the particular provisions of the Act, though, there is a 
more general manner in which the stimulus may well have helped. 
Specifically, while the economy was in “free fall” in late 2008 and ear-
ly 2009, the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve Board 
offered clear and strong statements that they would not stand by idly 
while the economy collapsed. This concerted and consistent display 
of intention may well have created favorable expectations among 
households and firms, giving them more confidence to spend and 
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Even if the stimulus has been successful, and especially if it has not, 
policymakers will face a series of difficult fiscal policy choices in the 
near term. The deficit is expected to decline from about 11 percent 
of GDP in fiscal year 2009 to 4.5 percent in 2013 under President 
Obama’s budget (Auerbach and Gale, 2009). The decline is due to 
the ending of the stimulus package, the ending of the financial bail-
out, and the overall recovery of the economy. However, if the econ-
omy recovers more slowly than anticipated, deficits could stay very 
high for a very long time, and even if the economy recovers as CBO 
forecasts, the deficit will rise to almost 6 percent in 2019, even after 
four years of full employment, and will continue to rise thereafter as 
a share of the economy.  
As a result, policymakers will need to decide when to cut off stimu-
lus and start imposing fiscal discipline. Cutting off stimulus too soon 
could plunge the economy into a new downturn, as happened to 
the United States in 1937 and Japan in 1997. Letting stimulus run 
for too long could ignite investors’ fears and create a “hard landing” 
scenario, a scenario considered plausible by Ball and Mankiw (1995) 
and Rubin, et al. (2004) under much more sanguine conditions than 
exist today. 
It is unclear whether the stimulus package will remain temporary. 
As legislated, almost all of the provisions expire by 2011, but there 
is likely to be significant political pressure to extend certain features, 
in particular, aid to the states. In addition, some of the tax cuts and 
government investments were explicitly designed to be part of the 
Obama administration’s longer-term agenda. 
Is another stimulus needed? In light of the history from the Great 
Depression and the Lost Decade, it seems likely that policymakers 
will under-provide fiscal stimulus in a major, prolonged crisis. But 
this conclusion is based on ex post analysis, once the full severity of 
these crises was known. As this paper is written, the U.S. economy is 
showing signs of recovery, and the addition of another stimulus pack-
age at this point could turn out to be poorly timed.
Whether additional action is taken in the coming months, it seems 
likely that discretionary fiscal actions will play an enhanced role in 364  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
policy discussions and research activities in the future, given the last 
decade’s increase in fiscal activism and continuing concerns about the 
state of the economy and the pace of any eventual recovery. There is 
certainly much more work to be done to understand the key issues, 
including how to conduct fiscal expansions while addressing long-run 
fiscal imbalances. Another key issue is the potential use of behavioral 
or other non-standard incentives in designing effective stimulus. The 
recent popularity of the “Cash for Clunkers” program, which as a con-
strained, in-kind payment might have been expected to be significantly 
less popular than a cash transfer, suggests the role that creative thinking 
can play in designing more-effective stimulus policies. 
Authors’ note: We thank Ben Harris and Ruth Levine for research assistance and 
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Endnotes
1Automatic stabilizers are substantially smaller in the U.S. than in most other 
OECD countries. As a result, while the U.S. had the largest discretionary stimulus 
package, the combined effects of its automatic and discretionary policies on the 
government’s budget for 2008-10 as a share of GDP are the sixth largest in the 
OECD (OECD, 2009). 
2See, for example, Eichenbaum (1997) and Taylor (2000). For more recent cau-
tious statements of an opposing view, see Blinder (2006) and Blanchard (2006).
3Examples include a change in revenues due to a stock market decline or a 
change in the income distribution.
4Because policy revisions between the winter and summer take effect starting 
midway through the current fiscal year, we reduce the weight on the current fiscal 
year by one-half and increase weights on subsequent years correspondingly.
5The 2002 paper included the lagged budget surplus instead of the projected 
surplus, but subsequent evidence (Auerbach, 2003) suggested that the latter pro-
vides a better fit.
6We focus on the results for the primary surplus because the results for revenues 
and outlays are less significant for the subperiods due to the small sample sizes. 
However, the coefficients themselves are all of the same signs as for the sample as 
a whole.
7The 2002 paper included the first two observations under George W. Bush 
along with those for the Clinton period.
8These criteria were put forward by Summers (2007), among others.
9Technically, the 2001 lump-sum payments were advance credits against 2001 
tax liabilities rather than rebates of past tax payments. 
10The one recent study that does not find evidence of liquidity constraints cre-
ating differential MPCs is Souleles’ (2002) analysis of the Reagan tax cuts. One 
caveat in making this interpretation, though, is that the estimated MPC is so high 
that differences between borrowing-constrained and other households may simply 
not be very large in this particular example. 
11Evidence from Japan is consistent the first and third stylized facts (Watanabe, 
et al. 2001).
12See Congdon, et al. (2009) for a general discussion of behavioral factors and 
tax policy. For evidence on how saving responds to cues or presentation issues, see 
Madrian and Shea (2001), Saez (2009), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Tufano 
and Schneider (2009). 366  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
13Broda and Parker (2008) report that those respondents in their survey who re-
ported that they did spend most of the rebate spent about twice as much out of the 
rebate as those who said they mostly saved the rebate or used it to pay down debt. 
This is not quite the same thing as reporting consistency between what people say 
they will do with the funds and what they actually do, but it provides some reas-
surance. In addition, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) report that there were no signifi-
cant differences in answers provided in the period before the rebate was mailed and 
the period when it was mailed, providing an additional robustness check. 
14Shapiro and Slemrod (2003, 2004, and 2009) have used similar methodology 
to ask respondents about the disposition of their 2001, 2003, and 2008 tax cuts, 
respectively. The results in each case are that around 20 percent of households say 
they will consume the rebate. Typically, paying down debt is the modal response, 
followed in frequency by saving the money and then spending the funds. None of 
the results show a pattern by income class that suggests that borrowing constraints 
are affecting the results. Coronado, et al. (2005) undertake a similar study of the 
2003 tax cut.
15Typically in this literature, taxes are defined on a net basis, as revenue less 
transfer payments. 
16Indeed, one recent paper (Favero and Giavazzi, 2009) suggests that the multi-
pliers for the tax shocks identified by Romer and Romer are considerably smaller 
if one models the shocks as explanatory variables in a multivariate model rather 
than simply regressing output on the tax shocks. The source of this difference is 
not clear, although the authors suggest that their results reject the assumptions by 
Romer and Romer that such shocks are independent of other explanatory variables.
17Although these models are more sophisticated, they echo the logic from sim-
pler Keynesian models regarding the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy in 
a liquidity trap. Eggertson also argues that a tax cut would be less expansionary in 
the zero-bound case, in fact having a negative effect on output, because their posi-
tive supply-side effects could have deflationary consequences. But this conclusion 
would not apply to most of the tax cuts adopted in the 2009 stimulus bill, which 
were largely inframarginal in their effects.
18We rely on Romer (1992, 1993) for historical GDP growth rates and Lebergott 
(1964) for historical unemployment rates. 
19DeLong (1996) offers cautionary comments about the reliability of the calcu-
lations involved in developing full-employment budgets when the economy is as 
far away from full employment as it was throughout most of the 1930s. 
20Romer (2009) states: “The results of the fiscal and monetary double wham-
my in the precarious environment were disastrous…..Policymakers soon reversed 
course and the strong recovery resumed, but taking the wrong turn in 1937 effec-
tively added two years to the Depression.” Eggertsson and Pugsley (2006) disagree, 
arguing that the 1937 downturn was instead due to confusing policy communica-
tion by policymakers. Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity  367
21Throughout this section, federal and subfederal budget estimates are based on 
the authors’ calculations of findings presented in Brown (1956). 
22Another implication of the model is that the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) of 1932, which suspended antitrust laws and gave unions increased bar-
gaining power, helped the recovery by reinforcing the expectation that prices and 
wages would rise (Eggertsson, 2008c). In contrast, neoclassical analysis of NIRA 
implies that, by reducing competition on the price and wage margins, the Act re-
tarded the pace of recovery. See, for example, Cole and Ohanian (2004). 
23See Bayoumi (2001), Horioka (2006), Krugman (1998), and especially Posen 
(1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2001) for analysis of the Japanese economy and 
policy responses in the 1990s. 
24McKibbin (1997) argues that this pattern reduces the net effect of the package 
because forward-looking financial markets will respond to the expected pressure 
on interest rates and exchange rates based on the announcement, but spending will 
only respond to the actual, eventual stimulus that is provided. Alternatively, one 
could argue that the large announcement (again, if credible) increases confidence 
and hence spurs increases in spending in and of itself, along the lines elaborated by 
Eggertsson (2008b). 
25For example, as Patterson and Beason (2001, page 501) note:  “In April 1993...
when the Miyazawa government announced its second economic stimulus pack-
age, MOF vice minister Ozaki Mamoru stated that ‘[t]he Ministry of Finance will 
resist to the end’ going into heavy debt again.” 
26See McKibbin (1997) and Patterson and Beason (2001). Due to the peculiari-
ties of the Japanese budget system, it is notoriously difficult to determine the mag-
nitude and stimulative impact of Japan’s fiscal stimulus packages. This difficulty 
has led to the frequent use of the term mamizu, or “clear water,” to describe the 
proportion of stimulus spending that is actually stimulative in nature. 
27For example, Posen and Kuttner (2001, page 129) report that “As many ob-
servers have stressed, traditional public works in Japan more closely approximate 
the building of pyramids in hinterlands, famous to macroeconomic undergradu-
ates, than do those in any other OECD country. Some have indicated that they 
would expect the multiplier on such wasteful expenditures to be less than one.”
28Concerns about overly tight Japanese fiscal policy continued after the end of 
the Lost Decade, even as the economy was recovering in 2003 and 2004. See Posen 
(2004) and Iwamura, Kudo, and Watanabe (2005). 368  Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale
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